Complexity and collapse: towards a systems view of society

This paper was presented on the 17^th April 2013 at the Research Seminars in Critical Thought seminar series which took place at the University of Brighton. Some minor modifications were made to its form during its presentation, the content however was unchanged.

If there is one thing that defines the contemporary world it is the lack of a grand narrative. This has become apparent in the last twenty five years through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the falsely claimed victory of liberal, free-market democracy. Not only do competing ideas of governance, economic growth and future aims play out against each other with no clear distinction between them, an increasingly globalised world makes understanding its operations more complex than ever. Whilst various theories have been proposed which try to explain the current state of affairs, they often rely on anthropocentric notions of society which struggle for universal acceptance due to global differences in culture. One emerging field which may be able to resolve some of these issues is that of systems theory.

In this exploratory paper I shall be looking at the application of systems theory to social and political thought. I shall first of all discuss the tenets of a systems approach through reference to Niklas Luhmann and Nassim Nicholas Taleb, leading me on to how a systems outlook tackles complexity and takes a more restrictive view on the possibilities of society. I shall then discuss how systems theory has explanatory potential in describing the collapse of various authoritarian governments and the robustness of democratic ones. It shall be my conclusion that a systems approach has the potential to deal with social and political issues in a novel fashion which is not reliant on abstract notions of humanity.

A systems approach to social complexity

Systems theory is an approach which aims to understand how elements with a system influence one another and act as a whole. Systems theory is essentially concerned with problem solving and views problems within the context of the whole system rather than being reduced to specific parts of that system.  It is used to deal with problems of organisational complexity, where the effects of interactions within the system are not fully known and any changes can lead to unintended consequences. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to work this into sociology comes from Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann posits in his social systems theory that society consists of systems such as the economy, politics, law and science which all operate separately from each other, are irreducible to each other, and follow their own internal logics. These social systems interact with each other in various complex ways which can’t causally be determined. Each system sees all other systems as being part of its environment and not existing in themselves. So for the economy, scientific discoveries are only of concern if they can be monetised; for the legal system, political and economic interactions only come into question in terms of whether they are illegal or not. Social systems theory reduces complexity by separating society into a number of social systems which in turn reduce internal complexity by adapting and evolving to systemic needs.

All that exists for Luhmann are functionally differentiated social systems that continually evolve to deal with their respective environments and thus perform their own tasks more efficiently. Whilst it would be hard to deny that systems exist in society, Luhmann’s particular method argues for systems as the way in which social complexity is reduced. In the same manner that a conversation revolves around a topic, social systems are only concerned with their particular interest which allows them to ignore anything that is not pertinent. The pitfalls of trying to tie social functioning down to a prevailing ideology then are avoided at the cost of decoupling the individual from society and placing them within its environment.

Though pursuing a different aim, Nassim Nicholas Taleb is a systems thinker whose various works can be coined as proposing Black Swan theory. In contrast to the black swan problem of induction, Black Swan theory only deals with the dominant role of unexpected events in history. Black Swan events are characterised by being hard to predict through modelling due to their low probability of occurrence, regardless of whether this perception is due to cognitive biases (as in the case of the finance industry pre-2008) or due to a scientific inability to quantify low-probability/high-risk events (such as the Japanese tsunami of 2010 and the horrors at Fukushima it unleashed). Taleb in this regard makes a request of his readers that we “don’t be a turkey”. A turkey lives for a thousand days being fed by a farmer with each passing day confirming in the turkey’s eyes the farmer’s love for it. On its last day however it is sent to the pot when its confidence in its situation is maximal. The “turkey problem” is a cognitive bias as the farmer was well aware of the turkey’s fate even if the turkey wasn’t. In the same manner, as Taleb correctly spotted in 2007 when The Black Swan was published, American financiers and policymakers ignored the underlying issues in the economy and its over-optimisation; in effect becoming turkeys themselves.

The “turkey problem” is indicative of the confusion between predictable, calculable linear occurrences as seen in games, and the non-linear, complex nature of social reality where local causal trains cannot be constructed. Complex systems are misunderstood when we try to model them through linear techniques, when we try to turn all scientific and social enquiries into classical physics. Complex systems are marked by a large number of elements with a high degree of interdependence, leading to a low degree of predictability. This is why sociological theories such as rational choice theory fail as they privilege individual rationality over all other facets of society. Rational choice theory works brilliantly in textbook examples but completely fails to describe the social reality of voting: it is not rational to vote but people do it anyway. Thinking in such a manner leads to us becoming turkeys and towards the occurrence of Black Swans as we become blinded by theories which posit certain outcomes whilst ignoring the possibility of others. Taleb coins the ludic fallacy to describe such thinking: many theories reduce life to a game with identifiable odds as if social reality was simply a more complex version of Blackjack. If such linear thinking leads us towards being turkeys and our reduction of reality leads us towards having the wrong map, perhaps it is better not to have a map at all.

Without drawing out too deep a theoretical argument, it is clear that Luhmann and Taleb share common traits in their ideas on society. Both consider that society is too complex to be understood in-itself and that only a systems approach can deal with the levels of complexity present. Luhmann would share Taleb’s view that there is no map for society, only present conditions and derived from these future concerns. Whilst Luhmann however proposes a systems approach to resolve the complexity of the social, Taleb is more concerned with highlighting complexity in order to illustrate the various ways that simplistic social planning can create Black Swans. From this both argue for a restrictive view of what we can achieve in society; the unpredictability of future events coupled with the inability to fully grasp current ones leads us away from utopian dreams towards a society where we have to make the best of what we’ve got.

What does this approach offer that other social theories don’t? First of all a systems approach is anti-reductionist: it denies theories which place any system as dominant within society so classical notions of structure/superstructure, for example, are rejected for portraying various operations under the umbrella of a central control system. It also denies anthropocentric social theories which reduce society to a facet of human nature. This radical approach potentially, as thinkers like Habermas claim, leaves systems theory containing a massive normative deficit. The attack on the possibility of autonomous individuality though is not limited to systems theory; it can also be seen in the moral arguments emanating from both religious circles and humanists (Habermas included) against genetic research. Whilst such arguments need to be explored, systems theory is based on its explanatory potential and not an Enlightenment requirement for reason.

Understanding social collapse through systems

Whereas systems theory proposes a restrictive view of the social in order to manage complexity and thus to some may be of questionable use, it can be utilised in a novel fashion to give an account of the stability of democratic states. One aspect of society that is often overlooked in theory is its collapse. History is littered with examples of overturned empires and imploded states. The Soviet Union imploded, at least in the eyes of Western observers, overnight. As the historian Niall Ferguson points out, a great deal of post-hoc explanation has been written regarding the sudden collapse of this empire and its purported inevitability. The Soviet bloc did not seem on the verge in the mid-80s however. The Arab Spring arose without warning and took the world by surprise. Regardless of its final outcome, the regimes of old collapsed and are being replaced with new ones. There are various theories which can account for societal collapse, from Marxist class antagonisms to more generalised conceptions of the yearnings of people for freedom. Democratic societies though seem more resilient to social upheaval. If we consider the political systems of the world over the last thirty years, the ones that have collapsed have been authoritarian in nature. If we see such instability in authoritarian regimes, what is it about democratic societies that make them politically stable?

An answer to this can be constructed through a consideration of system equilibrium. Any system aims to maintain itself in equilibrium, within its preferred operating conditions. Within the system there is always change and flux but as long as these fluctuations do not fall outside a limit from which recovery is not possible, a system can continue to maintain itself. A system’s fragility depends on how sensitive it is to change and whether it can adapt to new environmental conditions. Fragile systems struggle to deal with unexpected environmental pressures and hence tend to collapse when such pressure is applied. The 2008 financial crisis occurred because the banking system was over-optimised for conditions that suddenly were no longer there. The fragility of the system and lack of redundancy in its operations led to an economic crisis we still feel today. The best systems, Taleb argues, are anti-fragile and benefit from environmental impacts: evolution is the best example of this. Over time life has evolved from single cells to the plethora of species we see today. It has done this by responding to environmental conditions and adapting to deal with them. While all systems then have their own agenda as it were, all wish to continue operating and thus must maintain themselves against their environment. Fragile systems which cannot react well to change struggle, anti-fragile ones try to adapt to survive better.

Taleb uses Italy as an example of a politically stable country which has had more than sixty governments since the end of the Second World War. Japan cycles through prime ministers but has some of the highest levels of social stability in the first world. Even Thatcher’s rule did not lead to political instability, revolt or revolution. The difference between these countries and authoritarian ones is the redundancy built into the political system by the lack of meaningful difference in political outcomes. In a democracy, periodic elections serve as a shock-absorber for the political system. No one party can have total control of the political system and this control is only temporary as soon both the ruling party and opposition will have to prepare for fresh elections. This allows political grievances and ideas to be aired in public in order to gain electoral support whilst limiting the possibility of large changes in social and political structure. This makes democracy anti-fragile: political parties can continually evolve with changing environmental conditions and target their policies to portions of the electorate they believe may now be susceptible to them. If political power is lost it is only a matter of time until it can be contested again and the period in opposition allows one to develop strategies for re-election without the burden of having to implement actual decisions. If you compare this to authoritarian regimes, it is evident that they are extremely fragile. They exist based on a promise for more prosperity or as guardians to external threats. When environmental conditions shift, the economy falters, or security guarantees for the populace no longer garner popular support, the pressure on the political system cannot be dissipated through the shock absorber of political dissent or the outlook to new elections. Historically speaking the only method to remain in power is to then use oppression; if this fails, like all fragile objects, the regime will shatter.

This is a view also held by Luhmann and elaborated on by Hans-Georg Moeller. The political system is not the centre of society; it does not absorb all social power or necessarily reflect any one interest. The political system enforces a dynamic social power structure. It derives its power from legitimacy, defined here as the popular acceptance of authority. Democracy works because it has an inbuilt “stability by flexibility” which allows instability to be managed by the guarantee of free elections. This has the added bonus of what Luhmann terms a “reflexivity of power relations” where the electorate, who otherwise have virtually no other political input, get to have their say. This serves to legitimise the political system in two ways. Firstly it allows the population to be placated by allowing them limited access to the political machinery through voting. Secondly it requires politicians to tailor policies to win elections and thus to please those from whom the votes are gained. Hence even in times of social upheaval like 80s Britain there was little threat to the continuation of the parliamentary system as Thatcher could be removed from power at the next election (even if it is a crying shame she wasn’t). Juxtapose this against the state of the Soviet bloc in 1989 and it is clear that the central Russian authorities no longer had any legitimacy to continue their reign. Unlike the democracies of the West, there was no structural flexibility in the Soviet system. With no predecessor government to blame and nobody to vote out, the Soviet political system, and with it its empire, collapsed.

While Luhmann’s conception of the political system is somewhat more refined than Taleb’s, both of them follow a systems logic in their description of the collapse of authoritarian regimes compared to the structural flexibility, or anti-fragile, democratic systems of the West. The complexity of the social does not lend itself to centralised political planning as such a move necessarily involves prioritising one interest over another. For Luhmann when one system interferes in another’s operations it does so only for its own purposes and by doing so almost certainly impedes the other’s actions. Thus the promise for more prosperity requires political intervention into the economy for political reasons, i.e. to gain political support through the successful enactment of a political claim. This often leads to unintended consequences, such as the implosion of the banks in 2008 due to previous government interventions artificially keeping them afloat in the name of ‘stability’. For Luhmann this overburdened systems with too many conflicting directives and increased complexity whilst reducing efficiency. For Taleb this attempt to stave off volatility for political stability led to systemic issues being concealed which exploded as a Black Swan. In a democracy if such plans fail a new party can be elected to enact a different strategy. In authoritarian regimes pressure is inevitably placed on the economy and other systems to deliver prosperity so that legitimacy can be gained.  When this prosperity does not occur or falters it places direct pressure upon the ruling clique and leads to system collapse. It should be noted that the argument for democracy is a systemic one: democracy works as it allows the system to better manage expectations, disappointments and change. From a systems point of view this is far superior to any form of government which lacks the flexibility to adapt to environmental change. Democracy’s power lies in its ability to deal with and adapt to increasing complexity, it is not derived from transcendental arguments for freedom.

Conclusion

In summary, a systems approach to society may well be able to deal with the complexity of the social world in a much more efficient manner than classical theories which rely on anthropocentric worldviews. I have discussed two systems approaches in this paper, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s Black Swan theory. Luhmann’s work is more sociological and posits that systems, not people, make up society. Taleb’s is more concerned with the problems of modelling complexity and the creation of systems which implode when low-probability events occur, the so-named Black Swans. In dealing with social complexity both theories believe, as Taleb put it, that there is no map for society: we must implement a much more restrictive view of what is achievable in our future planning. Whilst problems may be highlighted with the decentring of the individual in society and a potential normative deficit, systems theory can provide an explanation for the superiority of democracy which is not reliant on abstract notions of liberalism or freedom but on its ability to manage complexity and expectation. Whilst further research is required into the possibilities of a systems approach to society, the transition from narrative to function that it offers may well solve more problems than it raises.